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Abstract

of users to reach across the world and share their music collections with complete strangers in a chaotic
and somewhat inefficient manner. Even as Napster
was essentially shut down, these communities organized themselves in more chaotic, less efficient, and
exceedingly popular ways. The initial explanation for
this phenomenon seemed simple: there is collective
benefit in sharing.

Peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing of resources, and technologies for facilitating resource sharing have witnessed tremendous advances in the recent past. A.1;
these technologies become commonplace, emphasis

must be placed on the survivability of such communities in the face of non-cooperative peers (freeriders,
malicious users). While incentive-based approaches
provide possible solutions, similar problems in ecological populations are solved by complex social interactions that have evolved over the ages. Evolutionary
biology has addressed these problems and numerous
models of cooperation between selfish organisms have
been proposed to explain how factors such as altruism, guilt, and the sense of justice have evolved in
spite of harsh life-or-death conditions. These studies
provide blueprints for essential computational techniques in support of stable, scalable, robust, and
highly cooperative P2P communities. In this paper,
we present a range of stable models of social interaction, their relevance to P2P communities, the associated computational bottlenecks in the context of
P2P networks, and motivate the need for the next
generation of structured and unstructured resource
sharing networks.

1

The tendency to cooperate towards achieving a
common goal appears natural. Unfortunately, so is
the tendency to stop cooperating and to take advantage of the benevolence of one's peers. Small communities can withstand attacks by selfish members
by identifying and isolating them. The fear of being
expelled from such communities :is indeed a major deterrent to non-cooperation. COIlventional P2P communities, however, are generally too large and the
underlying information flow mechanisms too weak,
for such deterrents to be effective. The challenge of
designing a robust P2P network therefore involves
incorporation of effective methods for identification
and elimination of non-cooperating peers. In this paper, we examine the computational basis for building
a stable and scalable P2P community that is large,
maintains a h.igh degree of anonymity, and is robust
to groups of non-cooperating peers.
Issues of stability and scalability have been of principal interest to research on P2P networks. Scalability was among the first problems addressed in
the context of structured P2P networks, since fast
routing, and efficient placement and location of re-

Introduction

Conventional P2P and pseudo P2P networks such as
Napster, Gnutella, and Kazaa have enabled millions
1

sources arc critical performance parameters. A5 re- ability that they will be attacked by a predator. A5
source sharing becomes widespread, uncooperative predators tend to attack prey that is closest to them,
users become a threat to the integrity of such net- animals that are preyed upon try to cluster so that
works. Even if the cost of sharing a resource is the area from which an attack can come (their cell
small, it can be shown (using various models of co- in the Voronoi diagram of the members of the popoperation and behavior) that a small number of non- ulation) is minimized. This comes at a cost though,
cooperative peers can prove fatal. This is because co- as their grazing area is minimized as well. Since the
operative peers that encounter such users tend to be- cost of being killed is much higher than that of losing
come non-cooperative, themselves, or leave the net- some food, the formation of herds is favored.
work. This reinforces negative behavior and eventuIn evolutionary biology such communal behavior :is
ally leads to the collapse of the network.
explained by units of selection attempting to maxiTo prevent this scenario a number of incentive- mize their benefit, even when said behavior can only
based mechanisms have been proposed. These mech- be described as suicidal at first look ([4]). Ganle
anisms involve various forms of pricing ([1], [2]), theory has been influential in this line of research
based on the intuition that if one accrues credit only and has provided the necessary analytical tools. The
by sharing a resource and must expend credit to ac- paradigm of the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is used
quire a resource, freeriders will be unable to attack to study the success and stability of behaviors in the
the network. The primary challenges associated with presence of alternate strategies and with a scoring
architecting such networks include scalable protocols model for all possible outcomes of an interaction. We
for handling currency and robustness to collusion. describe tIllS paradigm in more detail in Section 3,
These challenges continue to be areas of active re- but note that we assume that there is a cost c > 0
search interest. One potential drawback of incentive- associated with allowing another peer to access a rebased schemes is that such schemes may be less ap- source and a benefit b > 0 f!'OIll successfully accessing
pealing to new Ilsers, who, contrary to their inten- a resource.
tions, might be perceived as non-cooperative until
A score is associated with each peer bru;ed on the
they can build enough credit.
outcome of the interactions he has been involved in.
Consequently, in the context of a single interaction,
it is preferable for a peer to avoid sharing so ru; to
maximize his score. When a peer enters the network
his score is set to 0, even if this is not the first time
he has entered the network. Upon termination of a
session, the p!'Obability that he will use the network
again, and the extent of use are proportional to the
score achieved during the lru;t session. In other words,
a peer that accesses a large number of resources and
who was not burdened by other peers accessing resources from it, is more likely to return than a peer
who did not access any resources but served a large
number of other peers. This is analogous to the evolutionary assumption that the expected number of offspring an organism leaves is p!'Oportional to a score,
or fitness, it accumulates over its lifetime. A poor
strategy results in a few, if any, descendants, simi-

This position paper addresses an alternate approach to building stable networks. Experience with
current resource sharing networks indicates that incentives other than acquiring a desired resource are
not essential to the survivability of such communities. Large neb-Yorks such as Kazaa (Kazaa provides
a pricing utility, but it is optional, and most peers
choose not to use it), Gnutella, iMesh, and WinMX
appear to do well, effectively harnessing selfish behavior to build a cooperative base. This mechanism
is not unlike the development of altruism between organisms, which has been studied extensively in evolutionary biology. In this context, Hamilton ([3]) provides an excellent example of cooperative behavior
based on entirely selfish motives. Here, the appearance of herds is explained on the basis of a population
of animals trying to minimize their individual prob2

We, finally, present a third class of strategies - contrite players (Section 5), that can correct misunderstandings over the intentions of players or errors in
protocol implementation and execution. The main
intuition behind these strategies is remorse. A player
that has mistakenly decided not to cooperate, for
example, due to communication failure, can repair
his status by unconditionally cooperating in the next
round, demonstrating his contrition. Contrite strategies alleviate the problem of vendettas when histories
are u:;ed as guides and can be as good as the latter.
The rest of tillS paper is organized as follows: in
Section 2 we briefly summarize related work; we formally define notions of stability, equilibria, and optimality in Section 3; we present various strategies
for achieving these desired criteria in Sections 4 6, along with associated overheads in P2P networks;
and finally motivate the development of technologies
in support of robust communities in Section 7.

larly to a dissatisfied peer, who will stop using the
network or will change his strategy the next time he
joins the network.
The idea of applying game theoretic models to
P2P networks is, by no means, new. However, it
has generally been assumed that unless direct incentives are employed, a network is vulnerable to noncooperating peers (freeriders) and can only be supported by benevolent users who do not mind sharing
their resources ([5], [6], [7]). An interesting and natural concept that can substitute incentives is that of
memory. Users ean remember the behavior of those
they have interacted with and can communicate their
experience across the network. This is a method
commonly used in other communities (for eg., eBay),
where the record of a user is published for all to sec.
This model has worked well in deterring malicious
users. A similar model has also been proposed in
the context of P2P networks ([8]). However, maintaining a satisfactory, large history in a decentralized
manner is difficult in large networks. Furthermore,
it is difficult to sanction non-cooperative peers when
they can change their identities at no cost and effectively eraEC their record. In Section 5, we discuss how
shared histories are vulnerable to collusion, misconception, and deliberate misinformation, even if problems associated with changed identities are solved.
Research in this direction, though, has derived some
strong results that can be used to architect P2P networks, ru; long as one remains aware of the limitations
of history-based strategies.

2

Related Work

As has been mentioned, there has been some work
on applying game theory to the :;tudy of P2P networks. The tendency is to explicitly motivate cooperation by incentive mechanisms. Golle et al. ([lD
propose micropayments as the incentive. V\'hile this
is an intuitive approach, enforcing micropayments in
a secure manner is a challenging problem in itself
([10]). Lai et al. ([8]) have studied, experimentally,
the impact of shared histories. Their work is closer
in spirit to ours, since they show that cooperative environments can form without incentives. As we have
briefly discussed, and will expand on later, shared histories suffer from scalability and robustness (fidelity)
problems. However, they do provide several desirable
characteristics.
V\'e cannot, and do not intend, to present a comprehensive list of references for related work in evolutionary biology. An excellent summary of the work
in this field can be found in [11]. We would like to
note that one of the earliest modcls of selfish behavior leading to cooperation was described by Trivers

An alternate, scalable and powerful set of strategies is based on obseruation. In Section 4, we discuss a strategy called Observer Tit-For-Tat (OTFT).
According to this strategy, users derive information
about the behavior of their co-players by observing
interactions they do not personally participate in.
When approached by a player they know has not
cooperated in the past, they ignore him. Pollock
and Dugatkin ([9]) have analyzed the performance
of OTFT and their results, when applied to P2P networks, show that OTFT can defeat freeriders under
a minimal set of constraints.
3

in 1971 ([12]). Dawkin's work ([13]) popularized the
notion that ruthless competition is the driving force
behind every hereditary trait, including those that
are characterized as altruistic.
Finally, an interesting experiment was conducted
by Axelrod in 1984 ([14]). A tournament of computer programs was conducted. The game was one
of Prisoner's Dilemma, and the goal of the experiment was to see what strategies would succeed. The
result was that a strategy called Tit-For-Tat (TFT)
dominated. We will describe TFT in Section 4, but
we note that the theoretical analysis for TFT predicts
its dominance in the setting of the experiment ([15]).
Although the setting was very dilferent from that of
P2P networks, as the population was small and the
identities were persistent, the fact that competition
through automated interfaces conforms to the theoretical results of evolutionary biology is encouraging.

3

cun maximize their 5cores by alternately cooperating
and defecting and the game becomes trivial.
Nowak and Sigmund ([16]) showed that when the
players make their deci5ions alternately, so that one
of the players knows his co-players decision in the
current round before deciding, the additional condition of T - P = R - S must hold. TILis is obviously
the case in P2P networks due to the 115ymmetry of
one of the users initiating an interaction by requesting a resource. Moreover, if two peers decide they do
not want to allow each other to download, they have
only a negligible cost and no benefit and we can set
P = o. In this case the benefit of deceiving another
user into allowing you to access a resource, without
reciprocating, is R - S. Since the benefit S of being deceived should be negative and the benefit R of
mutual cooperation should be positive, it holds that
T > R > P > S in our adaptation of the Prisoner's
Dilemma to P2P networks. We refer to R 115 benefit and S as cost, although thc latter i5 actually the
inverse of cost. We do this to be consistent with the
conventional analytical framework, which is indifferent to the sign of S.

Stability, Equilibria and Optimality in P2P Networks

A second useful concept is one of equilibrium.
Roughly, an equilibrium is reached when both players
do equally well. The concept makes sense only if multiple rounds of the game are played. Equilibria are
not extremely relevant to our problem for two reasons. The first is that an equilibrium can be reached
when both players adopt defection as their strategy,
or, equivalently when the network is made entirely of
non-cooperative peers. The second reason is that an
equilibrium can be disturbed by an inV115ion of other
strategies. For example, a population consisting of
defectors (peers that do not cooperate with anyone)
is in an equilibrium. However, if a Humber of new
members decide to cooperate with other cooperators
and form a cluster, they can defeat the defectors.

In this section, we discuss some of the game theoretic
concepts commonly used in evolutionary biology. A
detailed introduction of these concepts is beyond the
scope of this short paper and formal definitions can
be found in many of the papers whose results we discuss. The interaction between two users, or players, i5
modeled using the Prisoner's Dilemma game. When
a round of the game is played, each player decides
whether to cooperate or defect (as the name suggests,
the players are prisoners and declining to cooperate
with your co-player implies that one defects to the
captors). If both players cooperate, they receive a
score of R. If both defect, they receive a score of P.
If one of them cooperates, but the other defects, the
defector receives a score of T and the cooperator, a
score of S. For the game to make sense, we must have
T> R> P > S. Multiple rounds of the game can be
played and a cumulative score for each player is maintained. In this case, we must have 2·R > T+S. The
reason is that if T + S is larger than 2 . R, the players

To address these problems, the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) is introduced. According to Maynard Smith's definition ([17]), a strategy E is ESS against a strategy E/, if the benefit
A(EIE) of adopting E in a pure E population is
4

strictly larger than the benefit A(E'IE) of adopting
E', DC, if A(EIE) ~ A(E'IE) and A(EIE) > A(E'IE').
The second condition ensures that an ESS cannot
be defeated by non-superior strategies that invade
in clusters. For a strategy to be useful in P2P networks, it must at least be ESS against ALL D (defectagainst-all strategy).

Section 6. Image Scoring hru; been analyzed for the
minimum number of interactions dUl'ing the lifetime
of a player that guarantees that this strategy will
succeed. In the context of P2P networks, a shorter
lifetime implies that a new user who is hesitant, will
be easier to lure.

The concept of ESS formalizes the requirement for
robust strategies. However, it does not address the 4
The Importance of Reputaneed for a highly cooperative environment. Paretotion
optimal strategies are those that, when adopted by
the entire population, maximize the collective benTit-Far-Tat (TFT) is a simple, cooperative stratefit. We note that an ESS that always cooperates
egy in which players cooperate when interacting with
with those that cooperate is the ideal strategy for
strangers. However, once a player defects on them,
P2P networks, as it is robust, and, when it prevails,
they never cooperate with him again. Let w be the
all interactions are successful.
probability that two players interact in the future.
There are other properties of a strategy that can TFT can be ESS against ALL D (defectors), however,
make it desirable. If the initial population consists it needs high values of w to be so. In large P2P netlargely of freeriders, it is difficult for cooperators works, the probability that one encounters the same
to contact each other and, consequently, they might player again is small, especially if non-cooperative
leave the network. An ESS is not guaranteed to suc- peers periodically change their identities. When a
ceed in invading a population. There is usually a stranger is encountered, a TFT player is willing to
threshold on the size of the invading population for pay a price to learn how the stranger behaves. If
an ESS to prevail. However, this threshold is hard there is a good chance of interacting with the new
to predict. A cooperative strategy that needs a small player in the future and the price paid for that bit
initial population has a better chance of prevailing.
of information is reasonable, a TFT player will be
Low implementation cost is a highly desirable fea- successful. When w tends to 0, no matter how low
ture of any strategy. Evolutionary models do not in- the price, the information collected regarding a player
corporate the cost of adopting a strategy. If memory is going to be worthless. Defending against ALL D
is part of a strategy, we would like its capacity to be players in tIns scenario is impossible.
minimal. A strategy that floods the network to colPollock and Dugatkin ([9]) analyze a strategy
lect information is undesirable, for obvious reasons. called Observer Tit-Far-Tat (OTFT). TIns strategy
The results of Section 4 are spectacular for this rea- is designed to defend against ALL D by collecting inson, because they imply that stability can be reached, formation actively and without paying the price of an
in spite of the negligible implementation cost.
uncooperative transaction. An OTFT player behaves
It is also desirable that a strategy can succeed UD- like TFT towards strangers. Instead of maintaining a
der short generations. The usual assumption is that private history of past interactions, however, he oba further round is played between two specific players serves an interaction between two other players. If
with probability w, so that the expected number of the interaction is successful, he classifies the two parinteractions between this pair is l~W. If the popula- ticipants as cooperators. If not, he classifies them as
tion is made of n + 1 players, the expected number defectors, irrespective of what the reason for the failof interactions during the lifetime of a player is l~w' ure could be. If a player that has been observed and
However, this need not be the case, as we will see in classified in the past tries to interact with the OTFT
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player, he cooperates if the request comes from a cooperative player and defects if the request comes from
a defector. A player classified as a defector may well
be another OTFT player that defected on someone
he perceived as a defector, but this does not matter. A number of scenarios are analyzed, where the
population is in an equilibrium, one of TFT, OTFT,
and ALL D dominate and the other two strategies
attempt to invade. We summarize these results and
extend them to the special case of P2P networks.

A generalization of ALL D is a strategy called
ROVER ([18]). If the population is fragmented into
groups of stationary cooperative players, a ROVER
player moves from group to group, behaving as an
ALL D while he is in a specific group and leaving
when everybody in the group knows he is uncooperative. In the rest of the analysis, ALL D is replaced
by its more powerful ROVER counterpart. We denote by q the probability that a player classified by
an OTFT player, as defector, is indeed a ROVER.
This probability is at least 1/2 and approaches 1 as
• Proposition 1: In a population satumted with ROVEfu become more frequent.
simple game evolutionarily stable TFT, TFT is
• Proposition 2: In a population polymoryhic for
also evolutionarily stable against the mutation
ROVER and TFT (ROVERs and TFTs coexist),
clfUlS {OTFT, ALL D} for sufficiently high w <
TFT resists invasion by OTFT for sufficiently
1; further, some Prisoner's Dilemma games exist
high w < 1. Howevel', the threshold for w is
which preclude OTFT invasion f01· any w > O.
lower and there are more games that do not p1'Celude. invasion.
The necessary condition for OTFT to invade is
w

The necessary condition for OTFT to invade is

(1 - q)[2R - (T + S))
q(P _ S)
,

which simplifies, for P2P networks, to

T-R T-R
2R-(T+S)
max{T _ p' R _ S} < w < 1P S
< 1.
For a P2P network we can set T = R - Sand
p = 0 and derive the simpler condition

S

S 1-

w::::;l+

(1 - q)R
qS'

This is certainly feasible and the threshold approaches 1 with q, signifying that in a population where non-cooperative peers are a problem,
OTFT can do better than TFT.

R+S

S_R<w<-S-'

• OTFT docs not require infinite memory, unlike
TFT. Remembering only the last observed interaction is enough, therefore, OTFT is more scalable. A larger memory helps, however it does not
change the two propositions. A positive effect of
larger memory is that a player seen defecting in
two interactions, has a much larger chance of
truly being a defector. This implies that q grows
with memory size.

which is easy to verify that it cannot hold for
B < 0 < R. This proposition states that if somehow all the users of a P2P network played TFT,
a user that switches to OTFT would eventually
give up or change back to TFT. This, however,
does not imply that OTFT is useless. One of
the problems with TFT is that it needs to keep a
history of past interactions, whieh leads to scalability problems. As we shall see, OTFT needs to
keep only a constant size memory and can eliminate non-cooperative peers under certain constraints.

• Proposition 3: OTFT is EBB when TFT is not;
moreover, in principle w can be. 0 and OTFT is
still ESB.
6

A new variable z is introduced for this proof. z is
as there is always a small, but positive, probabilthe probability that someone engaged in mutual
ity that they will meet. The right side becomes
defection is seen and remembered by a future,
o only when z = 1, however, c can be reduced if
yet presently unencountered, player. F'reeriders
the cost of allowing a resource access is small.
have z = 0, but all OTFTs have the same z
The variable z gives rise to a set of interesting posvalue. Assume that OTFT is coded into the P2P
sibilities.
While wand c are beyond the control of the
clients, and that a few users have been able to
designers
of
a P2P network and will approach 0 as the
alter the code to behave as freeriders. The connetwork
grows,
there are ways to control z. Suppose
dition for OTFT to be EBS is
that an OTFT user A is asked by a stranger to allow
S
z
R
a download. A may spawn a "dummy", unconditionw> - - - - - - - . - - R-S l-z R-S·
ally cooperative user B , who attempts to download
from
the stranger. If the stranger seems uncooperaSince w = 0, the condition for OTFT to be ESS
tive
to
B, A will be non-cooperative to the stranger.
in the P2P setting reduces to
If the stranger is an OTFT himself, he will spawn his
S
own "dummy" C, which will cooperate with B. vVith
z>S_R'
both parties assured of the other's good intentions,
the original transfer can go through. This makes
We make a further assumption on the Prisoner's
z = 1 for OTFT players. For structured P2P netDilemma for P2P networks. We assume that the
works such as PASTRY and CHORD, an alternative
benefit of accessing a resource is larger than the
may be for a user A to store an aggregate of all his
cost of allowing another user to access a resource.
interactions at node hash{A) (the rendezvous point
This implies that R > -S and tlle stability conof A). This aggregate may be the result, success or
dition is always satisfied if z > 1/2.
failure, of A's last interaction, or the percentage of
• Proposition 4: FOT' sufficiently high z < 1, successful interactions to avoid manipulation of the
OTFT requires less initial clustering than TFT results. An OTFT user B contacted by A can query
hash(A) for the aggregate, and, based on this obto invade a population saturated with ALL D.
servation determine A's status. This is indeed not
This is an important result, since it can be shown dissimilar from how eBay ratings work, only, here
that a scattered and small population of OTFTs we need to distribute these ratings over the network.
can invade any network overwhelmed by frcerid- Again, this makes z = l.
ers and establish a cooperative environment. vVe
These strategies arc merely suggestions based on
introduce a new variable, c, to show this. c is the a formal analysis of an easily implementable and
probability that an interaction carried out by an very natural strategy. OTFT seelllS to correspond to
OTFT will be with a fellow OTFT, or the clus- Alexander's view of the prerequisite for indirect recitering of OTFTs. The condition for OTFT to procity as "direct reciprocity occurring in the pressuccessfully invade in a P2P setting is
ence of interested audiences" ([19]). Admittedly, noncooperative peers may try to collude and deceive co(1 - z)S
operative
players by, for example faking, successful
c> - R S·
interactions. Cooperative players may respond by
We want the right side of the inequality to be finding ways to make their observations more accuas small as possible. If it is 0, only two OTFT rate. This "arms race" is a common phenomenon
players, in principle, can eliminate a population in nature, especially among predator and prey. The
of freeriders, no matter how large the network is, positive aspect of this is that freeriders must expend
7

more resources. If the cost of allowing a resource ac- TFT for invading a population of defectors and it is
cess is small, freeriders will benefit from converting ESS in a broader sense than that discussed in Secto cooperative strategies.
tion 3: if there is a small, but positive, probability
that a move is misimplemented, no other strategy
does better than cTFT.
5 Repentance and Error Cor- The authors experiment with the behavior of mixtures of strategies. They conducted a set of experrection
iments where they set 8 = 0, P = 1, R = 3 and
T = 5.5. The effect of these payoff values is that
Boerlijst et at. ([20]) examine the problem of cooper- there is a high temptation to defect. The strategies
ation in a model that allows mistakes to happen and used were ALL D, cTFT, REMORSE (another erbe corrected. Suppose that a user has assigned all ror correcting strategy that cooperates if and only
the burden of enforcing a cooperative strategy to the if it was in bad standing in the previolls round or
P2P client. There are two things regarding the be- both players cooperated), and GlUM (a strategy that
havior of the client that could go wrong. Either the starts as cooperative, but turns into ALL D the first
software has an error and occasionally refuses to co- time it encounters a defection). All simulations start
operate when it is suppmmd to, or, due to a network with an ALL D population. A small probabilitY of
error it misunderstands the intentions of a coopera- mutating to another strategy allows the appearance
tive player and refuses to cooperate. These errors are of cooperative strategies. Each time, cTFT and REnot detected by the user, who might have been able MORSE eliminated the Wlcooperative strategies and
to resolve the misWlderstanding. If the cooperative established a highly cooperative environment.
players use a TFT-like strategy in which a player is
Finally, a strategy called Prudent PAVLOV
blacklisted if he refuses to cooperate, a simple errol' (pPAVLOV) is discllS::ied. Two pPAVLOV players
of this nature may lead to an incorrect vendetta. If will cooperate indefini.tely, if there arc no errors. If
the network supports shared histories, as in [8]' the a pPAVLOV player mistakenly defects, both players
result for users whose transactions incurred such er- enter a D state and they both defect. In the next
I
rors can be dramatic, with large parts of the network round, a Do state is entered and they both defect
being informed of their defection and refusing to ever again. They resume cooperation in the next round.
cooperate with them. To alleviate such problems, pPAVLOV is ESS for P2P networks if
Boerlijst ct al. describe and analyze a set of errorcorrecting strategies.
wR+w 2 R> -8.
We start with the simplest of these strategies, Contrite Tit-For-Tat (cTFT). cTFT a..'lsumes there is a Assuming that the w 2 R term is negligible, we have
In the next section
standing associated with each player. A player starts that pPAVLOV isESS ifw >
with good standing, but loses it if he defects on a we will see a very similar stability condition emerge in
player with good standing. cTFT players behave just the case of incomplete histories. pPAVLOV has two
like TFT players, until an error occurs. If a cTFT huge advantages over other strategies. The first is
player accidentally defects on a player of good stand- that it can correct errors in both the implementation
ing, he loses his good standing. In the next round, of the strategy and in the perception of a move. The
the cTFT player with bad standing cooperates un- second is that it is scalable.
Strategies based on standings are generally less
conditionally with a co--player, however, the co-player
defects without losing his standing. After this round scalable because they need to tag every co--player.
of repentance, the cTFT will recover to a good stand· pPAVLOV, on the other hand, needs to keep track
ing. As shown by Sugden ([21]), cTFT is as good as of where it stands with respect to a co-player,

-l

8

only if there has been some degree of interaction.
Strangers arc assumed to be cooperative. This leads
to pPAVLOV being suckered every third round by
ALL Ds, but as long as it is ESS it does not matter,
ALL Ds are eventually eliminated. In terms of P2P
networks, a user needs to keep track of other users
only until he leaves the network. The next time he enters the network, he can start with a clean slate. This
is a scalable scenario, since the history information
can be cleared when it exceeds a manageable size.
Every time the history is cleared, it is akin to a player
dying. Unfortunately, this affects the value w, as the
probability that a player will be seen again before his
record is cleared is extremely low. Since we need w to
be larger than -SIR for stability, pPAVLOV may not
be stable in a P2P setting. As network connections
become faster and cheaper, the cost of allowing a resource access becomes small and pPAVLOV becomes
stable. Furthermore, it could be that aftcr a certain
session length, users interact mostly with peers they
have seen recently. If this is the case, users that stay
in the network for a long time can discard information about peers they have not heard from in a while,
without hurting their pPAVLOV strategy. Such cooperative and persistent users can be influential in
stabilizing a cooperative network.
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alter the code and become undetectable freeriders.
Despite these shortcomings, scores are a Ilseful tool
for cooperative users. Nowak and Sigmund analyze
a similar policy in the context of indirect reciprocity
and how it may have evolved.
Nowak and Sigmund first conducted experiments
on a multivalued image score metric ([22]). In thcse
experiments, players started with a score of O. Random interactions between a recipient and a donor
changed the individual scores. If a donor refused to
cooperate, a unit was deducted from his score. If he
cooperated, a unit was added. The maximum score
was 6 and the minimum was -4. A negative score
indicated an uncooperative player. Each player decided to cooperate or not, as a donor, based on a
value k, fixed during a player's lifetime and inherited
by his offspring. The strategy was to cooperate with
recipients that had a score no less than k. A negative
k indicated a cooperative strategy. A positive k, a
non-cooperative one. k = 0 indicated a discriminatingly cooperative strategy, in which only those users
appearing to be freeriders are denied cooperation. A
lifetime lasted, on average, 2.5 interactions. After a
fixed number of interactions occurred between players of a generation, all players died. The next generation consisted of the previous generation's offspring.
The number of children a player left was proportional
to his fitness. Each time a player was the recipient
in a successful iuteraction, his fitness increased by
b. Each time a player was the dOllor in a successful interaction, his score decreased by c, 0 < c < b.
The initial population started with a uniform mixture of strategies. After just 20 generations, only
cooperative strategies were significantly represented,
with discriminating cooperators being the majority
and unconditional cooperators (k = -4) making up
the rest of the population. After 150 generations,
the few existing freeriders had eliminated all the Ullconditional cooperators. The freeriders, in turn, had
been eliminated by discriminating cooperators, who
became the only existing strategy.

Building One's Image

Kazaa implements an interesting policy: each user
has a standing score. This score improves with each
allowcd download. Periodically a small quantity is
subtracted, so that users keep sharing. This is different from an incentive-based mechanism, as users are
not obligated to consult their peers' standing before
deciding to cooperate with them. However, maDy of
them will be reluctant to cooperate with users in poor
standing. This standing score cannot be turned off,
unlike I(azaa's pricing policy. There are two disadvantages to this scoring. The first is that it needs a
trusted authority supervising each interaction so that
colluding users cannot artificially elevate their scores.
The same experiment is repeated, however, ranThe second is that proficient users may be able to dom mutations are introduced. The result was a
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cyclical effect. Discriminating cooperators would
win, but due to mutations, less strict cooperators
would appear, leading to a short proliferation of
free riders. Discriminating cooperators would reestablish a cooperative environment. A less encouraging
experiment followed. In this setting, only the recipient, the donor and ten random observers updated the
scores after an interaction. One player could have
different scores in the eyes of different players. After 100 generations, only 15% of the population were
cooperators. This percentage fell as the population
increased.
The problem translates immediately to P2P networks. Maintaining perfect score information eliminates freeriders, however, tlus is expensive and might
not be practical. Maintaining imperfect information
can be efficient, but is ultimately futile. A remedy
to this problem is as follows: a player has two evolutionary variables k and h. He cooperates only with
players whose score is at least k and only if lus own
score is less than h. This strategy, called AND, is successful in eliminating freeriders (players with k > 0),
even with incomplete information. However, there
is an associated price. The prevalent strategies are
reluctant to cooperate. With complete information,
the prevalent strategies were those with k ::s: 0 and
h = k + 1. The higher the mean It value, the more
cooperative the environment, but with complete information, only 55% of the interactions are successful. With incomplete information, there is some uncertainty on how accurate the information a player
possesses is and the prevalent strategies exlubited a
somewhat higher differential between hand k. Yet,
only 57% of the interactions was successful.

successful.
The authors observe an intriguing phenomenon
during their experiments. Suppose all players adopt
a simple, k = 0 strategy, but start with a random
score. The question whether this population converges to a cooperative one is non·trivial. Experimelltally, it is observed that there is a threshold on the
fraction of players that start with negative scores and
still the population converges to all-out cooperation.
This threshold is 0.7380294688360 .... If more players start with negative scores, the population converges to a non-cooperative one. Therefore a population in which more than 73% of the players appear
to be freeriders, although their policies are not that
of a freerider, still converges to a cooperative network. This observation does not translate directly to
P2P networks, because the cooperative policies help
convergence. However, it is a good indication that a
P2P network can survive a large number of freeriders,
even without incentives.

6.1

Predictive Tools

AL'ID and OR strategies may alleviate scalability
problems by disseminating information, but they do
not solve them. In a structured P2P network, the
result of an interaction can be communicated to a
constant number of random users. However, as the
network grows, this number must also grow to enforce cooperation. Nowak and Sigmund formally analyze their Image Scoring strategy when there only
two possible scores, good and bad ([lID. Their results may help resolve the scalability bottlenecks.
It is easy to see that when there is complete information about the standings, the strategy that cooperates only with those having a good standing is
ESS. It is also possible to derive the stability condition when score information is incomplete. Suppose
the probability that one knows the co-players score
is q. The stability condition is
c

A compromise between eliminating freeriders and
allowing a more cooperative environment can be the
OR strategy. According to this strategy, a donor cooperates if the recipients score is at least k or the
donor's own score is less than h. Nowak and Sigmund experimented with this strategy and with inq> b'
complete information, the trend was towards cooperative strategies (k ::s: 0)' with It values muformly This is reminiscent of the stability condition for
distributed. In this case, 80% of all interactions were pPAVLOV, since c is equal to -$ and b is R. This is
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also exactly identical to Hamilton's rule for altruism
through kin selection, which states that cooperation
through kin selection works whenever the coefficient
for relatedness is larger than the cost to benefit ratio
([23]). The problem in P2P networks is that if we just
try to disseminate information about the standing of
a player, the sheer size of the network will force q to
be almost O. Furthermore, if freeriders can change
identities at no cost, this inequality will never be satisfied.
A solution to tIlls problem is to give up on trying
to disseminate standings information and help cooperative users predict the behavior of a stranger. In
real life, when we meet someone for the first time,
we try to read certain signs that clue us in on his
character. We can apply the same principle to P2P
networks. WIllIe in [11] q is assumed to be derived
from the interaction history of a player, it could be an
oracle that gives this information. Can we build such
an oracle for P2P networks? When a stranger asks
for a resource, certain characteristics can be identified. How many resources is he sharing? What is the
nature of these resources? Are there other users trying to access resources from him? If not, can I access
something at random from him? If the network is fast
and the cost c is small, the prediction accuracy does
not need to be high for the cooperative strategy to
be stable. Non-cooperative peers may try to deceive
this tool, however, tIllS increases the cost of an uncooperative strategy and discourages such behavior.
'Ve believe that in existing, unstructured file sharing networks such as Gnutella and v.,'irmIX, there are
users that implement such strategies and try to infer
the nature of a stranger. Software designed to make
their predictions more accurate and easier to arrive
at could be a powerful aid against non-cooperative
peers.

possible to derive the dynamics of tills population in
the event of an invasion by freeriders. Suppose the
fraction of population that is made of unconditional
cooperators is p and the rest (1 - p) is made of discriminating cooperators. Depending on the values of
b, c, q, and the expected lifespan, there is a threshold for p above which the population cannot resist
an invasion by non-cooperators. On the other hand,
if p is below the threshold, the invasion wHl reduce
the number of unconditional cooperators and noncooperators will proliferate. However, in the end they
will bc eliminated. The Hew population will consist
of pi unconditional cooperators and 1 - p' discriminating cooperators, with p' being smaller than p. In
other words, after an unsuccessful invasion, the network is even more adverse to non-cooperators. As
a consequence, occasional bursts of non-cooperators
should be expected as the users become complacent,
however, the network will quickly emerge to a higher
state of cooperation.

7

Concluding Remarks

The results we have derived and summarized here
represent only a fraction of the literature ill population dynamics. Yet, a quick examination reveals
that the problem of handling non-cooperative users
can be solved without resorting to explicit incentives.
Certainly, if the information maintained at each peer
regarding the rest of the network is complete, eliminating non-cooperative peers with either of the three
classes of strategies discussed in this paper is easy and
even error correction is possible. Similarly, if there is
a centralized authority that maintains scores and if
these scores cannot be tampered with, standings are
very effective. The challenge is to design P2P networks in which users maintain only a limited alllount
A second interesting aspect relates to the robust- of information about the state of the network, each
ness of this strategy. Image Scoring is ESS, but once user can implement the policies independently, and
there arc no non-cooperative peers, the cost of keep- stabilization to a cooperative state is guaranteed.
ing track of the scores of other users is unnecessary.
OTFT can be a useful strategy for large networks
The population can drift to a mixture of discriminat- in which non-cooperating peers are common. If obing cooperators and unconditional cooperators. It is servations are effective, this is a scalable and re11

silient strategy. However, in a network where noncooperators are rare, tile cost and delay of simulating
a series of interactions can be an overkill. pPAVLOV
is more desirable in these- cases. As we have discussed, it has the property that it corrects errors in
both implementation and perception of a move. It
can be difficult to implement pPAVLOV in a scalable manner while keeping it ESS, however, stability
when freeriders are rare is not crucial. A combination of OTFT and pPAVLOV holds considerable benefit. If non-cooperators appear only rarely, the most
desirable strategy is pPAVLOV. If pPAVLOV is not
ESS for the specific network, the frequency of noncooperative peers encountered will increase. If it rises
above a threshold, the client may swith to the more
expensive, bnt more resilient, OTFT strategy, until non-cooperators become rare again. This process
can be made entirely transparent to the user. Implementing efficiently these two strategies is an open
problem and experiments on real networks should reveal fascinating behavior. In theory though, OTFT,
and pPAVLOV can stabilize any network.
A successful strategy that requires the user's involvement may depend on predicting the peer's behavior. It is hard to imagine that prediction can be
fully automated. However, providing the user with
the right tools can make it easy to employ. The advantage of prediction is that it can defend against
non-cooperators when changing ones identity has no
cost. Furthermore, it is stable even if the user decides
whetiler to change his strategy or give up the network
only after two interactions. A kind of balance on the
usage of predictive tools should also evolve. Accurate tools are more expensive than inaccurate ones.
Browsing the contents of the shared folder of a peer
says a lot about his behavior, however, simply assessing the number of resources he brings to the network
is faster and can be easily automated. Depending
on how expensive it is to allow a download and how
frequent non-cooperators are, users will lean towards
one of these solutions.

of users is that of the the briefly discussed ROVER
([18]). This division can be the result of a hierarchical
organization aimed at efficiency or of groups forming
on common interests. In any case, resilience against
ROVER, not just ALL D, can be a desirable property
for a cooperative strategy.
Finally, we would like to note that although in our
analysis we have assumed that the probability a peer
will meet the same peer twice and the clustering of
cooperative peers are negligible quantities, tIllS is not
necessarily the case in real networks. It is reasonable
to assume that if a user downloaded a file from a
certain peel', he will return to the same peel'. Estimating these values could reveal that strategies such
as pPAVLOV, that depend on a non"negligible ow to
be ESS and scalable, can be scalable, a.<; well as ESS.
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